Will animal welfare and trade policy makers ever see eye to eye?
By Professor Lisa Collins, University of Leeds, Professor Tony Heron, University of York and Professor Fiona Smith, University of Leeds
This month saw the publication of the Government’s Action Plan For Animal Welfare. With an entire section devoted to international trade and advocacy, the Action Plan adds further pressure on the Department for International Trade to ensure animal animal welfare standards are not forgotten in the ongoing negotiations, not least in the current talks with Australia.
Recognising in law that animals are sentient beings is a landmark step for animal welfare in the UK. Whilst the Animal Welfare Act 2006 recognised that animals feel pain and can suffer, the new Action Plan for Welfare goes beyond this, recognising through a series of bills that animals are sentient — that have the capacity to feel and experience positive and negative emotional states, such as joy, pleasure, pain and fear, and sets out plans for an expert committee to hold ministers accountable for animal welfare in policy. The Action Plan sets out a wide-ranging suite of reforms that will touch the lives of farm animals, wildlife and pets both on and off the UK’s shores, and bringing animal health and welfare fully into discussions and actions for the 25-year Environment Plan.
The Action Plan, produced by the Department for Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), claims the Government’s work on animal welfare extends beyond its own borders; it wants to solidify and enhance its position as a global leader in this field by promoting high animal welfare standards across the world. It states “we will build upon the opportunities presented by our departure from the EU to build an independent trading policy, in which animal welfare will play an integral part and which will complement our strong domestic standards. Our manifesto was clear that in all of our trade deals, we will not compromise on our high environmental protection, animal welfare and food standards”.
Interestingly the extent of the integrity of animal welfare in trade policy is about to become evident as the publication of the Action Plan for Animal Welfare coincides with the UK positioning itself to strike a free-trade agreement (FTA) with Australia, which if secured, as is looking very likely, would arguably constitute the UK’s most significant foreign policy achievement since it left the EU. Yet, we know the deal won’t be to everyone’s liking. As reported by Peter Foster and George Parker of the Financial Times, the terms of the deal have been the subject of a ferocious battle in cabinet between Environment Secretary George Eustice and Trade Secretary Liz Truss over the subject of agricultural tariffs.
What’s at stake?
As a net agricultural goods exporter, Australia sees the UK as a significant market opportunity, especially for its beef, lamb, dairy and sugar exports. At the moment, its access to the UK is controlled by tariffs and so-called tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), whereby only limited quantities of certain goods that meet UK food safety, quality and animal welfare standards can be imported tariff free. Australia, however, is pushing to have these tariffs and TRQs abolished. It is also calling for the elimination ‘where possible’ of non-tariff barriers on agricultural trade that it regards as unnecessarily trade restricting. In public, Australia is not being drawn on which of these non-tariff barriers it is targeting, although its opposition to the UK’s hormone beef import ban is well known.
At the same time, the prospect of direct competition with Australian beef and lamb is probably the last thing the British farming sector needs at the moment. Although the overall economic effects of a free-trade deal with Australia will be modest, it could have disproportionate impacts in Wales and Scotland where upland farmers are already reeling from the trade disruption caused by Brexit and the phasing out of EU subsidies, not to mention Covid.
Support for Farmers to improve welfare
While farmers look on to see the outcome of trade negotiations and prepare for the resulting ramifications, they may also be required to alter practices in line with Defra’s Animal Welfare Action Plan, which sets out clear intentions to give more powers to police to tackle livestock worrying, and from 2022, to provide a source of financial support for farmers to improve health and welfare standards through the new Animal Health and Welfare Pathway. This will include support for biosecurity improvements and diagnostic testing to reduce the risk of disease spread and to encourage early diagnosis to ultimately reduce the impacts of infectious disease. The Pathway will also support the implementation of change in production systems for public-supported welfare enhancements. This will be linked to more transparent food labelling, allowing consumers more easily to support the production systems that they value. To be most effective, this needs to be supported with investment in research that demonstrates the welfare potential of different systems, and balances this against the key issues of sustainability, production sufficiency and farmer livelihoods. Turner-esque aesthetics are appealing on packaging, but we need to ensure the reality matches up to the painted idyll.
The Action Plan states that most live exports of animals for fattening and slaughter will be banned and there will be further consideration on transport conditions for animals more broadly. Alongside this, further reforms to welfare at slaughter will be considered. Whilst many animal welfare advocates were hopeful that the Plan would ban the use of cages for laying hens and farrowing crates for pigs, instead it laid out intentions to examine these two housing systems as part of wider reforms. Farrowing crates represent a welfare compromise for the sow, severely restricting her movements for up to five weeks until the piglets have weaned. However, they are typically associated with higher piglet survival than fully open farrowing systems where piglets are at risk of being inadvertently crushed or suffocated by their mother moving around. Alternatives, such as the PigSAFE and other freedom farrowing systems4, allow low piglet mortality whilst permitting the sow freedom of movement and the capacity to better mother her offspring. N8 facilities such as the National Pig Centre at the University of Leeds and the C-DIAL at the University of Newcastle offer opportunities to demonstrate the welfare benefits of such alternative systems.
Whilst improvements through the Plan may reduce the individual risks and associated severity of individual welfare ‘hazards’ on the animals experiencing them, there is a significant gap on the impact of cumulative experience and how best to protect animals from a lifetime of more minor negatives. Whilst there are major issues to contend with, the minor issues tend to be overlooked. The cumulative impacts of repeated, or many different smaller issues is one that needs more investigation and scientists and policy-makers should work together to determine best practice here, for all farmed species.
Not one commission but two
Alongside pressure to meet promises in the Animal Welfare Action Plan, the UK’s deal with Australia comes hot on the heels of not one but two other separate reviews commissioned by the Government, both of which have produced recommendations for upholding UK food standards. The National Food Strategy (NFS) recommends a mandatory ‘verification’ system for FTA partners’ goods to enter the UK market tariff and quota free. Under this, food imports from the country concerned would need to show that they met a set of ‘core standards’, including but not limited to standards on food safety, animal welfare and the prevention of severe environmental impacts.
The Trade and Agricultural Commission (TAC), meanwhile, recommends that the Government ‘should work with trading partners within future FTA negotiations to lower tariffs and quotas to zero’, but only where the partner country can demonstrate ‘outcome equivalence’ regarding a ‘core set of standards’ in the areas of climate change, environmental, ethical and animal welfare standards. The TAC report recommends that imports failing to meet an equivalence test should be treated as instances of an ‘unfair’ trade practice and subject to ‘countervailing duties’ (import tariffs beyond those normally applied to imports).
The policy proposals offered by these two commissions are genuinely innovative and worthy of further study. If implemented, they could serve to disentangle the use of tariff and non-tariff measures for the purpose of upholding high standards from their use as economic protectionism. However, they also share three common problems. The first is that it is far from clear that using tariffs and non-tariff barriers in the ways proposed would be legal under WTO rules, where the issue of trade discrimination on the basis of different production methods is still a highly controversial one.
The second is that it is unclear what incentives trade partners like Australia would have for signing up to such a system, since the logical response would surely be that their own farming systems may be different, but they are hardly unfair.
Third, and most importantly, it is ultimately up to the Government to decide which, if any, of these recommendations it wishes to take up and enshrine in its FTAs. This, after all, remains the central political problem raised by the Australian deal – how to satisfy the competing interests of different stakeholders and who to blame when things go wrong.
With the Australia deal imminent, we get to see for the first time how, in practical terms, the Government reconciles the tension between its simultaneous commitment to upholding UK food and animal welfare standards while liberalising trade through bilateral free-trade agreements.
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Understanding the economic impacts of animal diseases
By Professor Jonathan Rushton, N8 AgriFood Chair at the University of Liverpool and Programme Director of the Global Burden of Animal Diseases (GBADs) programme.
With continuing population growth and rising demand for food, livestock and aquaculture are integral to improving food and nutrition security, health, and livelihoods.
These positive contributions are being undermined, however, by the negative effects of livestock production and consumption on society and the environment—e.g., production of greenhouse gases, environmental degradation, emergence of zoonotic diseases, and antimicrobial resistance. Furthermore, excessive consumption of some livestock products is linked to risk of non-communicable diseases.
There is little evidence available for addressing these concerns through improving livestock production and animal health systems, and no systematic approach to understanding global livestock populations and the resources invested in animals by societies globally. Knowledge of the major constraints on livestock productivity and the means to address them are insufficient, and there is a need for robust assessments of the impact of livestock on food security, disease risks, and climate change. In 2018, the Global Burden of Animal Diseases (GBADs) programme was launched to address these vital issues.
Since that time, we have made progress in developing a comprehensive framework for characterising livestock populations and assessing the value invested in livestock, as well as a system to capture net losses in production and societal expenditure on animal health issues. The GBADs programme recognises that many animal health problems are related to production and nutrition issues that need to be resolved in a socioeconomic context.
An important organisational development has been the integration of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) within the leadership of the GBADs programme. This role acts upon OIE’s 2016 resolution to improve understanding of the economic impacts of animal diseases and gives an important institutional platform to the GBADs programme. Through existing OIE partnerships, GBADs will strengthen links with the Food and Agriculture Organization of the UN, WHO, and the International Livestock Research Institute.
GBADs will focus initially on making global estimates of animal disease burdens; over time, this will be strengthened with in-depth country, disease, and sector-level studies. The GBADs programme now has strong engagement with research groups in Australia, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Ireland, and the UK and is developing national case studies in those locations. The team has engaged with multinational companies involved in pharmaceuticals, livestock production, and data management in livestock systems.
The GBADs programme has themes that will describe where, how, by whom, and why animals are kept in populations and production systems. This theme will generate and integrate information on the biomass contained in livestock populations, and estimate the level of investment in animals and the infrastructure used to manage them. Levels of production will be compared with a state with no disease and perfect health and nutrition to estimate an Animal Health Loss Envelope (AHLE). Adapting methodology from the Global Burden of Disease Study, the AHLE will then be attributed to specific causes through animal health ontology and attribution. The AHLE will account for loss and expenditure at farm level, and will calculate the impacts of lost animal health in the wider economy and trade and on human health. To support the latter, we will collaborate closely with the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation and WHO. The GBADs programme’s themes will be supported by engagement with governments, the private sector, and non-governmental organisations. Additionally, education programmes will be established that provide a global knowledge framework to assess the effects of animal disease and health problems in livestock. In this way, GBADs will provide information to public and private sector decision makers, adding value to their management of animal health and welfare.
Climate change and pandemic disease are two of the major threats facing humanity, threats with which livestock are closely entwined. The GBADs programme team is committed to a better understanding of our livestock systems and of their positive and negative impacts on society and the environment locally, globally, and nationally. There is an urgent need to develop intelligence systems able to improve decision making for people managing livestock to limit the environmental consequences and public health risks related to livestock production and consumption, while also helping people across the world access high-quality protein and micronutrients, produced in a humane way.
What to expect from UK agrifood trade policy after the Brexit transition
By Professor Fiona Smith, Professor of International Economic Law, University of Leeds, and N8 AgriFood Chair in Agrifood Regulation
With the UK’s imminent departure from the EU, there are four emerging trends in UK trade policy that have implications for agrifood.
On 29th October, the Secretary of State for International Trade, Liz Truss, delivered a speech at Chatham House in which she set out the UK Government’s vision for new independent trade. The UK Government intends to determine a path independent from the EU which will focus on “neither sacrificing core values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the environment, nor economic opportunities”. The speech was short on specifics and a full trade strategy document is expected. For now, it is possible to identify four emerging trends in UK trade policy that are relevant for the agrifood sector.
1. “Free and fair trade” will be at the core of UK trade policy going forward
The UK’s agrifood tariffs (import taxes), as set out in the UK’s Global Tariff (UKGT), will take effect on 1st January 2021. These tariffs will apply to imports from countries with which the UK does not have a trade deal. The UKGT largely replicates the EU’s agrifood tariffs at present, with some simplification on 10% of all agrifood tariffs.
This emphasis on free trade might signal an ambition (at least in the Department of International Trade) to gradually reduce those tariffs over time to coincide with UK farmers adjusting to the new market conditions in terms of the UK’s new trade relationship with the EU, as well as the changes to farm support set out in the Agriculture Act 2020, which came into force on 11th November. There is no indication of such a move yet, and certainly any changes in that direction should take into account what impact further agrifood tariff liberalisation might have on the UK’s farmers’ competitiveness.
2. Trade policy will be values driven
The UK Government has made it clear on several occasions that it intends to retain existing high food quality, food safety and environmental standards for domestically produced and imported agrifood products. In November, Liz Truss strengthened this commitment by placing the Trade and Agriculture Commission (TAC) on a statutory footing.
The TAC will now produce an annual report evaluating the impact on animal welfare and agriculture of each trade deal signed by the UK after the end of the transition period on 31st December, though its current remit over environmental provisions will be removed.
Whilst the TAC’s new statutory powers will head off concerns that the dreaded chorine washed chicken is headed for UK plates, it is less certain that the same kind of scrutiny will exist for concerns about pesticide residues. It should be noted though that the House of Commons Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (EFRA) Committee has already indicated it intends to carry out detailed scrutiny of the impact of the UK’s new trade agreements on food quality, food safety and environmental standards. As a consequence, concerns about environmental protection can be raised before the EFRA Committee in oral or written evidence instead.
3. The UK will champion a return to a rules-based trading system under the World Trade Organization (WTO)
The WTO has experienced headwinds of its own in recent times, so the UK’s leadership on WTO reform will be welcomed by many WTO members. WTO rules did not prevent the UK-China trade war and the consequential effects for US-China agrifood trade. In July 2018, the Chinese imposed a 25% retaliatory tariff on imports of US soy, resulting in a 75% drop in US soy exports to China between 2017 and 2018. US exports of wheat to China also declined by 90% and dairy exports were reduced by 30% during the same period. There was some trade diversion as US farmers sought new markets, but trade patterns remain difficult to predict. The dispute is ongoing. These market distortions make it difficult for companies operating within global value chains on a ‘just in time’, rather than ‘just in case’ supply model, to accurately predict agrifood trade flows.
The UK’s leadership in the WTO on these and other issues might help unlock some of the WTO’s current institutional challenges. Negotiations to change the WTO’s rules to accommodate trade policies designed to combat the effects of climate change on agrifood production are stymied. President Trump blocked the appointment of the front runner candidate, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, to be the new WTO Director General in October. She was to be the first woman, and the first African to take on the role. She is a strong advocate for WTO regulatory reform that recognises the link between trade and environment, as well as the need to reform the rules on agricultural subsidies and export restrictions. President-elect Biden’s new trade policy focus is yet to be announced, but it is hoped he will withdraw the US objection to the new WTO Director General appointment, and he will also enable some movement on changes to the multilateral trade rules.
4. “Friends and family first”
The UK intends to channel 80% of all its trade through bespoke trade agreements by 2022. This is an ambitious target. As of mid-December, the UK has concluded 27 trade agreements with 55 countries. The number of agreements signed so far is impressive. These are slightly amended versions of existing agreements entered into by the EU that the UK benefited from during its EU membership, so there is no substantial change to the UK trading position with these countries.
Liz Truss made it clear in her Chatham House speech that as far as wholly new trade agreements are concerned, the UK Government intends to prioritise negotiations with “longstanding allies and nations who share [the UK’s] values”. Consequently, negotiations with the US, Australia and New Zealand, as well as a UK-EU deal will be prioritised. While the UK-EU trade deal lurches ever closer to the 31st December cliff edge without signs of a conclusion (at the time of writing), there is more hope for the US, Australia and New Zealand negotiations.
Indeed, there is a draft text “at an advance stage of preparation” for the UK-US deal, which includes an ambition to increase market access for Scottish salmon and whisky exports to the US market. The US election has slowed progress. President-elect Biden has made it clear that the US will not enter into a trade deal with the UK unless the UK resolves how it will achieve frictionless trade across the Northern Irish border. Whether the UK-EU agreement concluded on the 9th December that exempts tariffs on 98% of goods travelling across the Northern Irish border and reduces some border checks will allay President-elect Biden’s fears, remains to be seen. The UK-Australia and UK-New Zealand trade negotiations are less advanced. The second round of trade negotiations with Australia occurred in October this year and the UK only issued a formal invitation to New Zealand to enter into negotiations in July.
Where does this leave the UK trade policy after the Brexit transition?
The UK is the first major country to leave a large trade agreement with its close geographic neighbours, as well as the first to reintroduce trade restrictions. As such, the UK is writing the rulebook. There is no precedent for how the UK should craft its trade policy, particularly in relation to agrifood. Despite the political rhetoric, the initial phases of UK trade policy have focused on renegotiating many trade agreements the UK already benefitted from while an EU Member State. Rollover of these existing benefits after the end of the transition period on 31st December 2020 is not automatic, as every trade agreement is the product of a negotiation between two (or more) states.
Many of these countries – like Japan, with whom the UK struck a deal in October – are keen to renegotiate market access commitments with the UK that they had to concede to the EU. The UK seems to be pivoting away from Europe and towards Asia too. Liz Truss has already signalled the UK’s intention to join the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) in September this year. Whether membership of the CPTPP delivers new markets particularly for meat cuts not eaten by UK consumers, is currently unknown. The significant distances over which goods must be transported and the costs of doing so may deter some UK exporters despite the existence of a trade agreement. And, it should be mentioned that the UK will be negotiating these trade agreements with significant headwinds, including the impact of COVID-19; the call for reshoring of agrifood production; and a shift from ‘just in time’ to ‘just in case’ supply chain models.
Whether the UK can become “a major voice in global trade” once again remains to be seen. What is clear, is that the ambition to pivot the UK to being a hub for trade to create more export opportunities, provides new possibilities for UK agrifood business in the medium-to-long term.
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